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The Issue 
In recent years, after the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease) 
crisis in Europe, and after the first case of BSE was found in Alberta, both regulation and 
producers’ initiatives have lead to an ever smaller demand for meat meal and animal fat 
used in animal feed.  Meat meal and animal fat  were produced in great part from the 
rendering of carcasses, i.e., animals that died on the farm due to disease or accident. In 
Quebec,  agricultural  producers  used  to  sell  the  carcasses  to  rendering  plants.  Now 
however, demand for meat meal and animal fat has all but disappeared, so producers must 
instead pay the rendering plants to dispose of the carcasses. The financial burden gives 
producers an incentive to get rid of the carcasses in less costly ways, not only by legal 
burial at the farm, but also by illegal disposal at the farm or elsewhere in nature (Deglise, 
2003; Radio-Canada, 2003;  Larivière, 2003a;  Mercier, 2004).  This leads to increasing 
environmental risks, specifically, soil, water and air pollution as well as potential health 
hazards, that need to be addressed. 
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Implications and Conclusions 
Environmental policies relating to the disposal of carcasses are difficult to implement 
because the government has imperfect information about producers’ practices. Subsidies 
would  likely  be  necessary  in  order  to  improve  that  information  and  trigger  legal 
behaviour.  New  markets  for  carcasses  could  also  be  encouraged,  in  particular  the 
biodiesel market, which could lead to multiple environmental benefits. 
1. Background 
The  Quebec Agriculture Ministry (MAPAQ) recognizes only three options for carcass 
disposal: rendering, legal burial and incineration (La Terre de Chez-Nous, 2003a). Legal 
burial  is  regulated  with  environmental  constraints  in  Quebec.  For  example,  areas  that 
flooded up to 20 years ago are not suitable, there must be a distance of at least 75 m to a 
water stream and 150 m to a drinking water source, the excavation must be deep enough 
but above underground water, the carcass must be covered with caustic lime and it must 
all be covered with at least 60 cm of soil on a flat terrain (MAPAQ, 2003). Due to these 
constraints, in most cases we can expect legal burial of carcasses to be more costly than 
illegal burial. 
In order to be legal, incineration must satisfy the norms of the Quebec Ministry of 
Environment (Langelier, 2000).  One important sanitary issue is that mad cow disease 
prions (i.e., concentrated animal protein that can transmit BSE) are not always destroyed 
during  incineration  (La  Terre  de  Chez-Nous,  2004;  Redvers,  1996).  This  shortcoming 
implies the potential for contamination of animals and humans, with risks of infection 
with some forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans. So there are sanitary 
risks with incineration; in addition, incineration at the farm is not affordable enough to 
become  widespread  (Larivière,  2003c),  nor  is  it  favoured  by  the  Quebec  Ministry  of 
Agriculture  (MAPAQ,  2003).  However,  pilot  projects  are  underway  to  assess  the 
feasibility, safety and costs of different incinerators available on the market (Conseil pour 
le développement de l’agriculture du Québec (CDAQ), 2005b). 
Of the three recognized options, rendering was preferred by most producers, so new 
options  must  be  found.  In  the  meantime,  the  illegal  disposal  of  carcasses  leads  to 
increasing environmental risks that need to be addressed. The issue is not negligible, since 
each year in Quebec about 6.5 million farm animals die before reaching the slaughtering 
age, especially milking cows, beef cattle, hogs, sheep and poultry (Deglise, 2003). 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In  order  to  maximize  social  welfare,  the  economic  distortions  that  characterize  the 
carcass-rendering market in Quebec must be identified and corrected. There are currently 
three such distortions or departures from the ideal situation. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  N. Bergeron and M.-F. Gagnon 
 
 
      14 
First, the rendering plant, Sanimal, is a monopoly. Indeed, under recent developments 
Sanimal has gone from being a monopsony, buying carcasses as inputs into its production, 
to being a monopoly as a service firm that requires payments from farmers to dispose of 
animal carcasses. This circumstance implies that the firm collects and disposes of too few 
carcasses at too high a price as compared to the perfect competition equilibrium. Second, 
the environmental risks related to the illegal disposal of carcasses are public, that is, they 
are shared by many people, while the costs of avoiding them are currently private, since 
agricultural producers are entirely responsible for them. Therefore, producers do not have 
proper  incentives  to  pay  as  much  as  would  be  optimal  for  Sanimal’s  sanitary  and 
environmental services (or for other legal options). Third, the government has imperfect 
information regarding the agricultural producers’ legal and illegal actions. This is due to 
high monitoring and enforcement costs. 
In the following section we discuss policies that could help to alleviate the distortions. 
We also talk about potential new markets, possibly requiring R&D efforts. 
3. Analysis 
Policy instruments need to be developed to correct the three market distortions described 
above. The policy instruments are discussed in sections 3.1–3.3. New markets could also 
be considered; these are discussed in section 3.4. 
3.1. Monopolistic Environmental Service 
First, the price that producers pay for monopolistic Sanimal to dispose of the carcasses 
could  be  directly  regulated.  The  deadweight  loss  would  be  decreased,  maybe  even 
eliminated,  because  agricultural  producers  would  pay  less  for  Sanimal’s  services  and 
more carcasses would be sent to the firm. Other ways to achieve this are to subsidize or to 
tax Sanimal’s operations in ways that would trigger optimal pricing. 
In 1987 several rendering firms merged in Eastern Canada; these mergers lead to the 
creation of Sanimal. The federal Competition Bureau tried for more than five years to 
prevent such a merger, without success. Sanimal even challenged the constitutionality of 
the Competition Tribunal at the Supreme Court. Ultimately, a March 1992 decision in 
favour of the concentration of rendering activities in Ontario benefited Sanimal, and the 
Competition Bureau did not challenge the mergers further (Vallières, 1992). This series of 
events suggests that direct price regulation is an unlikely solution, since it would likely 
imply going back to court over the same issues as were debated for more than five years.  
Subsidies would of course be welcomed by Sanimal, but their political feasibility is 
questionable since the monopoly is already gaining a greater profit than it would under 
perfect competition. Taxpayers would likely object to such government expense. Another 
possibility is to impose a tax scheme on Sanimal’s operations that would lead to optimal 
carcass disposal. Taxpayers would not object since the tax would go to the government’s 
budget, but Sanimal would likely challenge such policy. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  N. Bergeron and M.-F. Gagnon 
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Finding a workable solution to the monopolistic distortion is therefore not an easy 
task.  Theoretically,  any  of  the  three  policies  suggested,  i.e.,  price  regulation,  tax  or 
subsidy, would work, but the situation is complicated politically and legally. In addition, it 
is not clear that there is a political will to correct the distortion at this time. 
3.2. Environmental Risks 
Illegal disposal of carcasses has been a problem for a few years now. For example, in 
2003, 14 rotting bovine carcasses were found in the woods and in a field on a producer’s 
land  in  the  Estrie  region  (Larivière,  2003a).  An  agricultural  producers’  union 
representative (UPA president in La Patrie, Bernard Lapointe) said that there would be 
more cases. According to him, burial of carcasses is problematic because it could lead to 
water contamination (Larivière, 2003a). Furthermore, a hog carcass was found floating in 
a river, and 9 deer carcasses were found on the ground after the snow melted in the spring 
of 2003 in the Outaouais region (Larivière, 2003a). So there is evidence of some illegal 
disposal of animal carcasses by producers in Quebec in recent years. This is not to say that 
this is a widespread phenomenon, but there  certainly are greater incentives for illegal 
behaviour  than  before  because  the  legal  disposal  of  carcasses  has  become  costlier.  If 
better alternatives are not found rapidly, we would expect the illegal disposal of carcasses 
to increase over time. 
Environmental risks due to the illegal disposal of carcasses are borne by the public. 
Leaving  carcasses  on  the  ground  in  hidden  or  remote  areas  or  burying  them  without 
regard to the potential short-term and long-term impacts can lead to soil, water and air 
pollution as well as health hazards for animals and  humans.  This pollution can affect 
many more people than just the agricultural producers. However, the costs associated with 
the legal disposal of carcasses (by selling them to Sanimal or burying them according to 
environmental  regulations)  are  borne  solely  by  the  agricultural  producer.  Clearly, 
agricultural producers have the wrong incentives, since they take into account only their 
own environmental risks associated with their decisions, and not those borne by the rest of 
the public. By leaving carcasses on the ground, away from their own land, producers 
minimize  their  cost;  at  the  same  time,  they  reduce  their  own  environmental  risks  by 
transferring them to the public. This is because the environmental risks related to carcass 
disposal are heterogeneous in space, as they depend on wind directions, direction and 
speed of water leaching through the soil and direction of water streams. For the same 
reason, the environmental risks decrease with distance. The illegal disposal of carcasses 
results in lower marginal costs of environmental risk avoidance for producers, but higher 
expected marginal environmental damage for the public. Optimally, the private marginal 
cost  to  avoid  environmental  risks  should  be  equal  to  the  expected  public  marginal 
environmental damage. Therefore, government intervention is needed to internalize the 
environmental risks in private agricultural production. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  N. Bergeron and M.-F. Gagnon 
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In environmental policy, economic policy instruments are generally preferred to other 
less flexible, “command and control” instruments (Hanley, Shogren and White, 1997). 
This  is  because  economic  instruments  lead  to  least-cost  strategies  for  dealing  with 
environmental risks in the short run. Furthermore, in the longer run, economic policy 
instruments give greater incentives for R&D and adoption of less environmentally risky 
technologies.  Economic  instruments  are  either  price  or  quantity  instruments.  Price 
instruments  are  taxes,  subsidies  and  legal  liability,  while  quantity  instruments  are 
transferable quotas or, equivalently, tradable permit  markets.  Typically,  environmental 
taxes and subsidies imply perfect knowledge of producers’ actions. Since in the case of 
animal carcasses the government has imperfect knowledge of producers’ actions, either 
feasible  policies  are  greatly  constrained,  or  a  way  must  be  found  to  improve  such 
knowledge. In cases of imperfect information, economists typically look for policies that 
give the correct incentive for producers to reveal the information themselves, or at least 
some of it. 
In the case of animal carcasses from agricultural production, permit markets would 
not be a good solution because of the imperfect information the government has. It would 
be easy for animal producers to sell permits, thus making money, while continuing to 
dispose of carcasses in an unsound manner. Everybody would want to behave this way, so 
there would be only sellers and few or no buyers in this market. A thin permit market 
would  not  be  efficient,  and  it  would  not  be  an  effective  way  to  reduce  the  unsound 
disposal of carcasses. Over and above the thin permit market and its failure to reduce 
unsafe disposal of carcasses, another problem arises: such a market implies allowing some 
unsound disposal of carcasses, providing a producer has the proper permits. However, 
under current regulation, unsound disposal of carcasses is not legal. Hence, the entire 
regulation on carcass disposal would have to be amended. Given the issues of thin market, 
lack of results and current regulation constraints, the quantity instrument is not an option 
in this case. 
Price instruments are another option. Animal producers could be charged a tax for not 
disposing of a carcass in an environmentally sound fashion. However, such a tax would be 
difficult  to  implement,  again  because  of  the  imperfect  information  the  regulator  has. 
Revealing such information would lead to higher costs for agricultural producers, either 
through  the  tax  or  through  costlier  disposal,  so  they  would  tend  to  not  reveal  their 
environmentally unsound behaviour in order to avoid the extra cost. A taxation scheme 
would  therefore  not  be  an  interesting  option  unless  the  regulator  could  obtain  better 
information on producers’ actions at low cost. 
Alternatively, an efficient subsidy would give producers the incentive to dispose of 
animal  carcasses  legally  and  to  reveal  information  in  order  to  obtain  the  maximum 
subsidy available. This is the carrot as opposed to the stick approach, which is more useful 
in cases where the regulator has imperfect information on producers’ behaviour and where 
it  would  be  very  costly  to  improve  such  information  (see  for  example,  Polasky  and Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  N. Bergeron and M.-F. Gagnon 
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Doremus,  1998).  However,  subsidizing  producers  who  are  already  substantially 
subsidized could be an unpopular policy, especially since governments are rationalizing 
their services. Governments are less inclined than in the past to give out subsidies, and 
taxpayers  would  likely  protest  a  subsidy  that,  after  all,  would  only  encourage  legal 
behaviour. While theoretically taxes and subsidies could both be efficient instruments, in 
a case where the regulator has imperfect information on producers’ behaviour, subsidies 
are better suited than taxes but political feasibility may be an issue. 
Another kind of price instrument that is sometimes used in environmental policy is 
legal liability (Segerson, 1995). In this context, taxes and subsidies are replaced by fines 
and rewards, depending on whether one is caught behaving illegally or not. Agricultural 
producers could be rewarded for legal behaviour, which is tantamount to the subsidy we 
just described. On the other hand, a fine could be charged in the case of illegal disposal of 
carcasses.  However,  in  the  absence  of  perfect  information  on  producers’  actions,  the 
regulator does not necessarily know when illegal behaviour has occurred, and in cases 
where there is evidence of illegal behaviour, it may not even be clear who the guilty party 
is. This is a problem similar to the difficulty with regulation of non–point source pollution 
in agriculture: if illegal behaviour is detected, the regulator is not sure who did it. Hence, 
in case of evidence of illegal carcass disposal in a given region, some game-theoretic 
scheme could be created, with fines to every suspect, that would force legal behaviour of 
all. Such game-theoretic schemes have been suggested to address the problem of non–
point  source  pollution  in  agriculture  (Segerson,  1988;  Segerson  and  Wu,  2003).  For 
example, if a carcass were found in nature, a high fine could be charged to every suspect, 
since the actually guilty party could not be found with the information the regulator would 
have. Under such a scheme, no one would have an incentive to cheat providing the fine 
and  the  probability  of  discovery  of  the  carcass  by  the  regulator  were  high  enough. 
However, such schemes are likely to seem unfair to those who did behave legally and thus 
to be politically infeasible. In any case, they have yet to be observed empirically. 
Overall then, it is difficult to find an environmental policy that would be effective as 
well as both legally and politically acceptable. This is due in part to the reluctance of 
governments  and  taxpayers  to  create  new  subsidy  programs  and  in  great  part  to  the 
imperfect information that the government has on agricultural producers’ actions. 
3.3. Imperfect Information 
As  mentioned  above,  the  government  has  imperfect  information  about  agricultural 
producers’  disposal  of  carcasses.  One  way  to  obtain  information  is  through  better 
monitoring in order to enforce environmental regulations. However, these activities are 
costly, which is why they are imperfect in the first place (this rationale was first presented 
in economics by Becker in 1968). Indeed the cost of monitoring all agricultural producers 
at all times is too great to be worth implementing. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  N. Bergeron and M.-F. Gagnon 
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One  avenue  through  which  information  could  perhaps  be  obtained  is  the  new 
traceability  system.  In  Quebec,  the  agricultural  producers’  union  (UPA)  and  the 
Agriculture  Ministry  (MAPAQ)  joined  forces  in  1998  and  developed  plans  for  a 
mandatory electronic traceability system in order for the industry to react rapidly in the 
case of an epidemiological crisis. Consequently, the Quebec Animal Health Protection 
Act was introduced in 2000 (R.S.Q., c. P-42, s. 22.1; 2000, c. 40, s.14) and in 2001, Agri-
Traçabilité Québec (ATQ) was created. ATQ is an autonomous, nonprofit organization 
whose mandate is to co-ordinate traceability efforts so that the information database on 
animals is centralized (Laronde, 2004; Agri-Traçabilité Québec, 2004.). Information is 
collected on animals, ownership, transfer, geographic location – all this from birth or 
import to death or export. Bovines were given priority, and plans were made as well for 
sheep and hogs to be traceable in 2005. Under this system animals need to be accounted 
for  at  all  times;  hence,  the  illegal  disposal  of  carcasses  could  be  detected  from  the 
traceability database. However, ATQ is jointly overseen by the MAPAQ, la Financière 
Agricole and the UPA, and it is not clear that the transfer of traceability information in 
order to enforce environmental regulation would be allowed by all parties. Furthermore, if 
producers had fines or taxes to pay if they were found illegally disposing of carcasses, 
they would have an incentive to cheat on the traceability database as well, thus threatening 
the traceability system. The social costs of such actions could be high, since they could 
ultimately imply the loss of some export markets, lower prices for animal products and 
increased  animal  and  human  health  hazards  related  to  mad  cow  disease.  Using  the 
traceability  system  to  obtain  better  information  on  the  illegal  behaviour  of  producers 
could endanger the system itself, so at first glance it is not a very promising option. 
In conclusion to sections 3.1 through 3.3, the monopolistic rendering firm Sanimal 
ought to be regulated. Further, subsidizing or rewarding agricultural producers for the 
legal disposal of carcasses would give them the incentive to act legally and to reveal 
complete information about animals that have died on the farm. Political feasibility is in 
question, but it could be argued that this option is the only one that would lead to legal 
and presumably environmentally safe behaviour. This policy will now be referred to as 
the Sanimal regulation–producer subsidy, or SRPS, option. 
3.4. New Markets and Technology 
Another  possibility  is  to  look  for  new  markets  for  carcasses.  Essentially,  the 
environmental problem at issue arose from a loss of the market for carcass by-products; 
finding new markets could thus be part of the solution. 
One interesting alternative is to use carcasses to produce biodiesel, a solution that will 
be referred to here as the biodiesel option. A few years ago, one of the largest rendering 
firms  in  the  United  States,  Griffin  Industries,  started  producing  and  selling  biodiesel 
(Biocycle,  1999).  We  therefore  know  that  this  solution  is  technically  feasible.  R&D 
financing may be necessary to improve cost-effectiveness, and tax or subsidy schemes Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  N. Bergeron and M.-F. Gagnon 
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may also be necessary for such a market to be developed. However, it could be socially 
less costly if the government were to encourage the biodiesel option rather than the SRPS 
option. In fact, even if it were more costly for taxpayers, the biodiesel option would likely 
have extra environmental benefits. Indeed, the fact that use of biodiesel would replace 
some use of petrochemical diesel could lead to a decrease in emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs). Such environmental benefits should be accounted for in the cost-benefit 
analysis of government intervention. Including the abatement of GHG emissions in the 
cost-benefit analysis increases the net benefit of the biodiesel option; this increase could 
make the difference between encouraging such a market or not. Comparative feasibility 
studies are necessary to assess which option is socially better, and biodiesel ought to be 
considered. 
Note, however, that in Quebec biodiesel is already produced by a monopolistic firm, 
Lauralco, so greater biodiesel production could lead to even greater economic distortions 
in the biodiesel market (Radio Canada, 2004). That firm produces biodiesel mainly from 
sub–food grade vegetable oil, used fry oil and animal fats. (Rothsay/Laurenco, 2002a, 
2002b and 2005; Agricom, 2004). Some government intervention would likely be needed 
in order to eliminate or alleviate the monopolistic distortion. 
Another possibility is the composting of carcasses, which is done in some regions of 
the  United  States  and  in  some  Canadian  provinces  (Farrel,  2002;  Cornell  Waste 
Management Institute, 2002; Bérubé, 2003; Rynk, 2003; La Terre de Chez-Nous, 2003b; 
Larivière, 2002). Such composting currently is not allowed in Quebec, in part because one 
must  be  sure  that  the  compost  temperature  in  winter  rises  high  enough  to  kill  all 
pathogens. Composting of poultry carcasses has been tested in the past, but it has not lead 
to any change in regulation so far (Larivière, 2002). Currently, pilot projects are underway 
for composting carcasses from hogs, bovines, sheep and goats (CDAQ, 2005a; Larivière, 
2003b and 2003d; Charlebois, 2004). It takes up to a year to compost bovine carcasses, so 
results should be available within a year or so. Regulation regarding on-farm composting 
of  animals  could  change  once  further  information  is  available,  and  efforts  for  market 
development for compost could be made. 
More marginally, an Alberta cement manufacturer has proposed to the Agriculture 
Ministry the use of meat meal in its production process (Bérubé, 2003). Indeed, cement 
plants sometimes use meat meal as fuel, and they can then use the resulting ashes in 
structural  cement  (Ontario  Ministry  of  the  Attorney  General,  2004).  Such  use  can 
decrease emissions of GHGs in the cement production process (Bérubé, 2003). This is an 
alternative market for meat meal, so cement plants’ demand for  meat meal should be 
estimated in order to assess this alternative further. 
In summary, these and other new markets for animal carcasses could be developed 
through R&D financing and facilitation of the emergence of new markets. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  N. Bergeron and M.-F. Gagnon 
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4. Conclusion 
In conclusion,  we suggest two possible options for  solving the problem of increasing 
environmental risks due to the illegal disposal of animal carcasses in Quebec. First, in the 
absence of new markets, the SRPS option is recommended. Under this option, Sanimal 
should be regulated such that it would decrease its carcass disposal price to producers. 
Given past legal challenges brought before the Competition Bureau, subsidizing optimal 
behaviour seems to be the least objectionable policy. Also under this option, producers 
should be subsidized to give them the incentive to behave legally. This course of action is 
recommended  because  taxes  or  fines  for  illegal  disposal  of  carcasses  would  lead  to 
producers hiding information from the government.  
Second,  new  markets  should  be  explored  for  the  longer  run.  A  technologically 
feasible alternative is the biodiesel option. If the net benefit of this option, including the 
abatement of GHG emissions, is greater than that of the SRPS option, then it should be 
chosen. Otherwise, the SRPS option is better. Additional potential markets are compost 
from animal carcasses and use of meat meal in the production process of cement plants. 
Feasibility studies and assessments of these new potential markets should also take into 
account the possible reduction in GHG emissions. 
In  the  long  run,  R&D  could  make  these  markets  more  interesting  by  decreasing 
production costs. Furthermore, the development of other new markets for carcasses could 
be encouraged. This would involve looking at what is done in other regions and countries, 
as well as making R&D efforts to find new, environmentally safe uses of animal carcasses 
as  inputs.  Government  financing  is  likely  to  be  required  for  such  R&D,  since  the 
environmental problem related to the illegal disposal of carcasses is a public one, i.e., 
environmental risks are borne by all. 
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